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THE "LANGUAGE OF LAW" AND "MORE
PROBABLE THAN NOT":
SOME BRIEF THOUGHTS
KENT GREENAWALT*

In the weeks after the conference whose proceedings are recorded here,
I have reflected unsystematically on many of the topics we discussed. On
two topics, it is worth offering some further development of my own
comments. This consists of elaboration, rather than clarification or
qualification. In the interests of clear presentation, I say enough here so that
a reader need not look at the conference transcript to grasp my points.
I.

THE "LANGUAGE OF LAw"

By far the most testy moments of the conference arose out of the
following problem. The Supreme Court had interpreted "knowingly" in a
criminal statute regulating interstate commerce of child pornography to
cover the age of participants, even though the placement of "knowingly"
in the statutory provision would, according to standard usages of English
grammar, lead to its not being applied to that element of the crime. 1 All
participants at our conference fairly quickly acknowledged the following
two truths: (1) the Court's construction did not fit ordinary English
grammar, and (2) there might be appropriate (legal) reasons why statutory
construction of a criminal statute would assign "knowingly" a force
exceeding that indicated by ordinary English usage. This agreement was
accompanied by sharp disagreement over whether one could properly speak
of a "language of law" according to which "knowingly" had this special
extension in criminal statutes. The lawyers said "yes"; the linguists said
"no." No lawyer asserted that a clear practice of this sort actually exists,
only that it might exist and that reasons relating to desirable culpability
requirements might support it. The lawyers, at least this lawyer, attached
no great significance to whether such a practice could be part of a

* University Professor, Columbia Law School. A.B. Swarthmore College (1958); B. Phil. Oxford
University (1960); LL.B. Columbia Law School (1963).
I. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct 464 (1994). See Problems, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 797, 798-89 (1995); see also Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 785, 898-920
( 1995).

989

990

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL.

73:989

"language," but we were exasperated by the linguists' assurance that it
could not. Modest reading after the conference has reinforced my
impression that the state of the discipline of linguistics leads scholars in
that field to insist that languages have consistent rules of grammar.
Therefore, the legal practice, if it existed, would have to be characterized
in other terms. The basis for this underlying assumption about what are
languages may be (I am not confident enough to assert that it is) the study
of natural languages by linguists and their theories about the human mind
as it relates to language. I (and others) insisted that whether the legal
practice, if it existed, could be called an aspect of "legal language in the
United States" was a matter neither of description nor normative judgment,
but one of conceptualization. We claimed that it was somewhat arbitrary to
preclude a conceptualization of "legal language" on the ground that the
treatment of "knowingly" suggested no general, consistent, alternative
grammatical practice, but rather amounted to an ad hoc deviation from
ordinary practice. My views about this have not changed, but I now see
two other questions as more important than the one on which we mainly
focused.
The most important practical question is how much it will count against
an existing or proposed practice of interpretation that the practice violates
ordinary rules of grammar. Most of the linguists, I think it is fair to say,
believed that conformity with English grammar counts for quite a lot in a
proposed interpretation. They did not deny that very strong (legal) reasons
could override the argument in favor of an interpretation that conforms with
ordinary grammar, but they assumed it would take very strong reasons to
do so (once someone recognized the implications of ordinary grammar).
Calling deviations a part of a "different language" ("Law English") might
make it appear that weaker reasons could justify judicial disregard of
ordinary English grammar. Just how strong reasons to deviate from
ordinary English grammar need to be is a very complicated question. (For
communications mainly from legislators to prosecutors and judges-such
as designations about culpability-perhaps the reasons need be less strong
than when communications are mainly to ordinary individuals and their
lawyers.) My point here is merely that this question deserves careful
independent judgment, and it should not be unthinkingly resolved, either
way, by one's choice of characterization of a deviant linguistic practice.
The second question is whether such deviant practices might be regarded
as a fit study for linguists, with a potential for insights drawn from their
discipline. Some lawyers at the conference expressed the view that the
linguists should not simply suppose that a deviant practice is not their
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business because it is not (for them) part of a language. Perhaps there are
reasons why linguists could not profitably study various subsystems that
include certain deviations from standard grammatical usage (and do not
include any consistent alternative grammar), but no one explained those
reasons. Again, the question of aptness for examination by particular
specialists should not be determined, either way, by one's choice of
explanatory concepts.

II.

"MORE PROBABLE

THAN NOT"

On the last morning of the conference, I echoed a point made by Bob
Bennett: that even if each of ten necessary factual conclusions were proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant's guilt might not be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. The reason is that if one cumulated slight doubts (each
slighter than a reasonable doubt) one might end up with a reasonable doubt
overall. Although, I do not suppose that jurors usually think in terms of
mathematical probabilities, this issue, and its civil analogue, can be
illustrated most sharply by artifically quantifying assessments made by
jurors. Suppose the prosecution must establish ten separate factual elements
to show guilt. A juror thinks each element is 97% likely. The chance that
the prosecution is mistaken about one of the elements is 23.26%. The juror
thinks that the overall likelihood of guilt is 73.74% (97% multiplied by
97% nine times), a figure less than "beyond a reasonable doubt." Despite
instructions that focus on proving particular elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, the appropriate inquiry for a criminal case involves a juror's
complete appraisal of guilt, not the appraisal of separate elements. (The
appraisal of separate elements can, of course, contribute to a reflective,
rational general appraisal.)
My musings after the conference have focused on an interesting
conceivable divergence of treatment of factual elements from legal
components in the ordinary civil standard that plaintiff must prove a case
to be more probable than not. Suppose that the law is clear that a person
under eighteen cannot give away property even if it is treated as "hers"
within the family. Gertrude has received a car for her high school
graduation; she has given it to her very close friend, Rachel, who
desperately needs a car and comes from a poor family. Gertrude's parents
bring a suit to get the car back. Rachel claims: (1) that Gertrude's mother
was there when Gertrude made the gift and said, "This is very generous.
We'd rather you keep the car, but if this is what you want to do with it,
that's fine."; and (2) that Gertrude is over eighteen. If either of Rachel's
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claims is true, she has a clear legal right to keep the car. Gertrude was born
in a remote village with no birth records and testimony is conflicting about
·her date of birth. The trier of fact decides it is 60% likely she was under
eighteen when she gave Rachel the car. Similarly, after hearing the
testimony of Rachel, Gertrude, and Gertrude's mother, the trier of fact
decides it was 60% likely the mother did not actually acquiesce in the gift.
With these estimations, the trier of fact concludes that it was 36% likely
that the gift was invalid. How this case should be treated is not
uncontroversial, and instructions to juries typically indicate a plaintiff need
only prove each element to be probable; but I believe the better view is that
the parents have failed to cany their burden of establishing that the gift was
invalid.2
One might challenge the foundations of this hypothetical by arguing that
such talk of probabilities about singular past events is inapt. However, it
makes sense to think of rational betting odds given available information,
or to think of what would be the percentages of instances either way if a
very large number of circumstances arose with this amount of information
available. Their approaches are sufficient to sustain use of the language of
probability, although I shall not try to defend that usage further.
As I was reminded by a challenging research paper I received this year
from Michael Fried about the determinacy of law,3 one might think of
decisions about legal rules in a somewhat similar way. A judge, for
example, might conclude that it was 60% likely he had reasoned his way
to the soundest legal conclusion, recognizing that he may have erred in his
judgment. I do not suppose that this perspective captures all judgments
about difficult legal issues or settles all questions about the determinacy of
law, but it does represent one aspect of legal (and moral) judgment. We
often experience a kind of tentativeness in judgment, feeling we have done
as well as we can~ but doubting whether we have made the decision that is
best in some sense that we accept.
Consider an analogy to the gift case. The facts are undisputed. Gertrude
was two months short of eighteen and her mother remained silent during
the transaction. Rachel claims that someone who is close to eighteen and
a high school graduate should have legal authority to give property away
and that parental silence should count as acquiescence. A judge finds each
claim plausible but is persuaded by neither. She concludes that it is 60%
2. See generally Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401,
404-07 (1986); RICHARD EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY 40-43 (1983).
3. A student paper, a copy of which is on file with its author.

1995]

THE "LANGUAGE OF LAw"

993

likely a strict line at age eighteen should be maintained and 60% likely that
silence should not count as acquiescence.
Rachel might argue that it is probable overall that she should win the
case. But, barring some complication concerning the legal issues-such as
a special rule that combines a mature age short of eighteen with parental
silence-Rachel will lose. Courts do not cumulate uncertainties about
resolutions of legal issues as triers of fact might cumulate factual
uncertainties. The reason is not difficult to grasp. Courts are trying to
resolve each legal issue in the soundest way possible. The result in a case
is the consequence of that series of resolutions. Especially when appellate
courts write opinions, judicial resolutions of legal issues have independent
importance. Courts do not tell us just how much they doubt their legal
decisions. Levels of uncertainty remain unrevealed. This practice is so
ingrained that judges may not consider how levels of legal uncertainty
could add up in a case. But it is interesting to note that in a case in which
one party must succeed on a number of legal issues to win, and judges
believe the decision of each of the issues is close but resolves itself in that
party's favor, that party will win, even though a reflective judge might
conclude that, overall, it is probable that at least one of the issues (which
she is not capable of identifying) should have been decided in a contrary
way, and that the contrary resolution of that issue would have generated a
victory for the other party. What is at least a possibly appropriate treatment
of factual uncertainties is not appropriate for uncertainties about legal
conclusions. Factual uncertainties may sometimes cumulate to tip the
decision; legal uncertainties do not.

